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“DE-AMERICANIZATION” DURING THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION: DERIVATIVE CITIZENSHIP AND
DECEASED PARENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
The Trump Administration’s war on immigration will be marked
in history as one replete with white supremacy and terror. Much
attention has been focused in the realm of undocumented immi-
grants, detention centers, and family separations because of the
pervasiveness of those issues and the gravity of the human rights
violations occurring in the United States. However, little focus has
been given to immigrants who are lawful permanent residents or
naturalized citizens at risk of denaturalization and deprivation of
their constitutional rights. This Note highlights the effects of the
Trump Administration’s war on immigration on citizens and green
card holders in the United States. This Note will analyze the Third
Circuit’s recent opinion in Tineo v. Attorney General United States
of America that conferred citizenship upon a lawful permanent resi-
dent born in the Dominican Republic to unwed parents amidst strong
government opposition. The government presented an archaic argu-
ment in saying that the Court was without power to remedy an
equal protection violation that would result in conferring citizenship
because of the plenary power doctrine. It is in that context of the
Trump Administration’s war on immigration that the government
used an outdated interpretation of the plenary power doctrine to
ensure that Tineo would not be granted citizenship. This Note will
demonstrate how courts have the power to confer citizenship onto
people whose constitutional rights have been violated.
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WAR ON IMMIGRATION
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S ARCHAIC ARGUMENT IN TINEO AND THE
ISSUE OF REMEDY
IV. PLENARY POWER AND IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine Then and Now
B. The Equitable Remedy to Confer Citizenship
CONCLUSION
207
208 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:207
INTRODUCTION
The Trump Administration has launched a war against immi-
grants.1 He has revived old tactics and strategies in the process of
“de-Americanization.”2 Though his policies have not been perfectly
executed, they will have long-lasting impacts on all immigrants in
the United States.3 The Trump Administration’s “anti-immigrant
message was heightened when he embraced a proposal ‘to slash legal
immigration to the United States in half within a decade’ by elimi-
nating family reunification categories . . . further evidence of his
desire ‘to tear apart communities and punish immigrant families.’”4
He has separated families, deported servicemen, and pushed his
message forward through the use of white supremacy.5 Although the
case of José Francisco Tineo seems separate and apart from these
efforts, this Note will explore how Tineo’s story is very much part of
the Trump Administration’s era of “de-Americanization.”6
Tineo was born to Dominican citizens on January 16, 1969, in the
Dominican Republic.7 Tineo’s father, Felipe Antonio Tineo Nunez,
and mother, Juana Margarita Sanchez Martinez,8 were not married
at the time of his birth.9 While Tineo was still a child, his father
Felipe left the Dominican Republic and moved to the United States.10
During that time, Tineo remained in the Dominican Republic with
his mother.11
In 1984, three years after his father became a naturalized United
States citizen, Tineo’s mother passed away.12 Shortly thereafter, in
1. See Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing the New Immi-
gration Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 291–94 (2018).
2. See id. at 319–21. Although this Note uses the term “de-Americanization,” it
acknowledges that the term American refers to all the lands in the Western Hemisphere.
Contra id. at 320–21. Using “American” to refer to the United States replicates hegemonic
notions while completely ignoring the different countries throughout the region as a
whole. As such, this Note uses “de-Americanization” to only refer to the process as
applied to the United States. See id.
3. See id. at 256, 319.
4. Id. at 319.
5. Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy,
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 197, 198, 201 (2019); Maria Ines Zamudio, Deported U.S.
Veterans Feel Abandoned by the Country They Defended, NPR (June 21, 2019), https://
www.npr.org/local/309/2019/06/21/733371297/deported-u-s-veterans-feel-abandoned-by
-the-country-they-defended [https://perma.cc/4HHA-V89S].
6. See Hing, supra note 1, at 319–21.
7. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 2019).
8. Telephone Interview with Jose Tineo, Petitioner in Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d
200 (3d Cir. 2019) (Sept. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Tineo Interview].
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1985, at the age of fifteen, Tineo moved to the United States to be
raised by his father.13 Tineo arrived to the United States as a green
card holder and took up residence with his father in New York.14
In 1993, Tineo was convicted for the sale of a controlled sub-
stance, which in turn initiated removal proceedings in 2000.15 Those
proceedings were terminated in 2001 due, in part, to the fact that he
submitted proof of his citizenship by presenting a United States
passport that was issued to him by the State Department on
June 20, 2001.16 In the years following the first proceeding, Tineo
traveled outside of the United States several times using the pass-
port he was issued.17
On January 15, 2008, after returning from a trip abroad, Tineo
presented his United States passport to Customs and Border Patrol.18
Tineo was detained and later issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) in
immigration court because “‘[he] falsely represented [him]self to be a
[U.S.] Citizen . . . to gain entry into the United States,’ thus violating
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(I) and (ii)” by presenting his passport.19 “The NTA also
charged Tineo as being a [foreigner] present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled, in violation of § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I).”20
Since U.S. citizens are not inspected upon re-entry in to the United
States, Tineo was charged for not being paroled into the United
States by an immigration officer.21
Tineo was subsequently put into removal proceedings for the
second time in two decades after he pleaded guilty to passport fraud
and aggravated identity theft in 2014.22 During his immigration
proceedings, “Tineo admitted to his criminal convictions, but chal-
lenged his removability” on the basis that his father was a U.S.
citizen.23 Tineo consistently argued that he derived citizenship from
his father because his father became naturalized while Tineo was
still a child.24 And Tineo recalled the many times he tried to explain
his immigration situation to his attorneys, family members, or any-
one who would listen to him.25
13. Id.
14. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019) (No.
16-1461) [hereinafter Tineo’s Brief].
15. Tineo, 937 F.3d at 205.
16. Id.; Tineo Interview, supra note 8.
17. Tineo Interview, supra note 8.
18. Tineo, 937 F.3d at 206.
19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Admin. R. at 890).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 205–06.
23. Id. at 206.
24. Tineo Interview, supra note 8.
25. Id.
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After being issued a United States passport in 2001, Tineo
thought there would be little in the way of affirming his status as a
U.S. citizen.26 Yet, years later, he would encounter a roadblock that
would impact the rest of his life.27 Not being able to renew his pass-
port, Tineo struggled to show that he was authorized to work in the
United States.28 In efforts to try to overcome his struggle, Tineo was
found guilty of trying to get a passport with fraudulent documenta-
tion.29 He was criminally convicted and again put into removal
proceedings where an immigration judge ordered his removal.30
After losing his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals,
Tineo appealed his case to the Third Circuit; he argued that he
derived citizenship from his father and that the gender-based dis-
tinction, which required that he be legitimated by his father as a
child, was unconstitutional.31 However, the government combated
Tineo’s argument by saying that the remedy requested by Tineo could
not be granted by the Court.32 The government presents an archaic
argument in saying that, even if the court were to find in Tineo’s
favor, the court does not have the power to confer citizenship onto
Tineo at all because the legislature has plenary power over matters
of immigration.33
The government argued that the court could not remedy the
alleged violation of the equal-protection mandate under the Fifth
Amendment because Congress has complete deference in making
determinations about immigration, residence, and belonging in the
United States.34 The government presents this archaic argument
relying on outdated principles of the plenary power doctrine, and it
is particularly important to recognize that the argument is intrinsi-
cally connected to a broader War on Immigration.35 It is part of a
war exacerbated by the Trump Administration, and the weapons of
choice include zero-tolerance policies, money, and white suprem-
acy.36 During his administration, Trump has promoted efforts to





30. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2019).
31. Id. at 208.
32. Id. at 215.
33. Id. at 215–16.
34. See Brief for Respondent at 45–48, Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200 (3d Cir.
2019) (No. 16-1461) [hereinafter Government’s Brief].
35. See Hing, supra note 1, at 259.
36. See Srikantiah & Sinnar, supra note 5, at 198–202.
37. Maryam Saleh, Trump Administration Is Spending Enormous Resources to Strip
Citizenship from a Florida Truck Driver, THEINTERCEPT (Apr. 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://
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separated thousands of migrant children from their families in de-
tention centers, which are ill-equipped to support the populations.38
The Trump Administration has gone as far as to threaten taking away
birthright citizenship as a means to further his agenda to punish
immigrants and their families.39
In Part I, this Note will analyze Tineo’s case and the decision of
the Third Circuit that conferred his right to citizenship. This Note
will analyze the government’s archaic argument that asserts that
the court is without the power to provide Tineo with such a remedy in
Part II. Next, this Note will examine whether similar arguments have
been asserted by the government before and whether they have pre-
vailed. In Part III, this Note will fit Tineo’s case within the broader
context of the Trump Administration’s “de-Americanization” policies.
In Part IV, this Note will highlight the plenary power doctrine and
the power the court has exerted over issues of nationality. Finally,
this Note will demonstrate why the government’s argument holds
no merit.
I. TINEO V. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
On September 15, 2015, an immigration judge “order[ed] Tineo’s
removal to the Dominican Republic” because “he failed to meet the
definition of a ‘child’” to derive citizenship.40 The immigration judge
found that Tineo’s father never “legitimated” him, which was required
due to the unwed status of his parents, barring him to qualify for
derivative citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1409, the immigration stat-
ute for children born out of wedlock.41
Tineo subsequently appealed his removal to the Third Circuit,
alleging that the immigration judge’s interpretation, the practical
effect of which was to deny Tineo of his derivative citizenship based
on his father’s inability to “legitimate” him after his death, violated
the equal-protection mandate of the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution.42 The issue Tineo presented in his appeal to the Third Circuit
theintercept.com/2019/04/04/denaturalization-case-citizenship-parvez-khan
[https://perma.cc/8NSS-M8SX].
38. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, ‘He Turned Purple’: U.S. Overlooks Ill Asylum Seekers,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/politics/trump-asy
lum-remain-in-mexico.html [https://perma.cc/NMV7-6GH9].
39. Patrick J. Lyons, Trump Wants to Abolish Birthright Citizenship. Can He Do
That?, N.Y.TIMES(Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/birthright-citi
zenship-14th-amendment-trump.html [https://perma.cc/DAV5-GSWL]; see Bill Chappell,
Trump Administration Targets ‘Birth Tourism’ With New Visa Rule, NPR (Jan. 23, 2020,
2:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/23/798874112/trump-administration-targets-birth
-tourism-with-new-visa-rule [https://perma.cc/99AZ-YU57].
40. Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 10.
41. Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 5–6; 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2020).
42. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2019).
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was whether an “illegitimate” child can derive citizenship from his
unwed father, after the death of his mother and after never having
been legitimated according to state statute.43 The court also consid-
ered the broader issue of “whether precluding a father from ever
having his born-out-of-wedlock child derive citizenship through him
can be squared with the equal-protection mandate of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”44
For Tineo to derive citizenship from his father, he needed to meet
the definition of “child” under the naturalization laws at the time his
father came to the United States.45 To derive citizenship, “[a] child
born outside of the United States of [non-citizen] parents . . . becomes
a citizen of the United States upon . . . [t]he naturalization of the
surviving parent if one of the parents is deceased.”46 In other words,
citizenship can be derived from a single parent who becomes natural-
ized in the United States.47 Under this statute, Tineo should have
been able to derive citizenship from his father because his father was
naturalized and his mother was deceased.48 However, the definition
of “child” under the immigration statute complicated Tineo’s case.49
For the purposes of immigration and nationality, a “child” is
defined as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age and
includes a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or
domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile,
whether in the United States or elsewhere.”50 Tineo was required to
demonstrate that he was legitimated in New York or the Dominican
Republic through a formal process in order to meet the definition of
“child” for the purposes of the statute.51
The argument Tineo presented before the court was that the
definition of “child”—as applied to the immigration statute regard-
ing automatic citizenship for children born out of wedlock abroad—
creates a gender-based distinction between mothers and fathers,
and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.52
43. Id. at 206–08.
44. Id. at 203.
45. Id. at 209.
46. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a)(2) (West) (repealed 2000) (emphasis added) (outlining the
conditions for automatic citizenship for children born outside the United States to non-
citizen parents).
47. Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 14.
48. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a)(2) (West) (repealed 2000).
49. See Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 14–16; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a)(2) (West)
(repealed 2000).
50. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(c)(1) (West); see also Third Circuit Holds that Gender-Based
Distinction in Statute Governing Derivative Citizenship Violates Equal Protection, 96
INTERPRETER RELEASES 36 (Sept. 16, 2019) [hereinafter INTERPRETER RELEASES] (defin-
ing “child” under the immigration statute).
51. See Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 1–2, 15–16.
52. INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 50.
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The interplay between the statutes prevented Tineo’s father from
conferring citizenship onto his son; Tineo was never legitimated
through a formal process, nor was he born in wedlock.53 Tineo points
to the fact that his father never could have legitimated him because
the laws of both the Dominican Republic and New York required
marriage as the only form of legitimation at the time he was born.54
Because his parents were not married, the law did not recognize
Felipe as his legitimate father.55
At first glance, the immigration statute regarding automatic
citizenship for children born out of wedlock abroad may seem to apply
to Tineo’s case; however, it applies only to children legitimated by
marriage.56 This distinction creates an inconsistency because if his
mother became naturalized, Tineo would have automatically de-
rived citizenship from her.57 In contrast, because his father was the
one who was naturalized, Tineo could not automatically derive citi-
zenship from him.58
Tineo argued that the distinction between mothers and fathers
was unconstitutional.59 Moreover, Tineo argued that the court must
apply intermediate scrutiny to such gender-based classification in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales-Santana
v. Sessions.60 Tineo maintained that “[p]reventing a father from con-
ferring citizenship on a child in his care—after his mother’s death—
is not substantially related to an important government interest” to
overcome the equal protection violation.61
However, the government argued that Tineo could not derive
citizenship from his deceased father because he did not meet the
statutory qualifications of a “child.”62 The government argued that
Congress intended to exclude “illegitimate” children in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1432(a)(3), the immigration statute regarding automatic citizen-
ship for children born out of wedlock abroad.63 Because the statute
provides an exhaustive list of qualifications of a child, according to
53. See Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 1, 3, 15–17.
54. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 2019).
55. Id.
56. Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 16–17.
57. Id. at 18–19.
58. Id.
59. Tineo, 937 F.3d at 203–04.
60. See Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 11–12.
61. Id. at 20–21 (explaining that important government interests include promoting
legitimate family relationships, preventing fraudulent claims of paternity, ensuring
sufficient ties to the United States, preventing statelessness, and protecting the rights
of a noncitizen parent).
62. See Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 24–26.
63. See id. at 24–27; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a)(3) (West) (repealed 2000).
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the government, Congress intended to exclude children born out of
wedlock who were not legitimated.64
The government argued that mothers and fathers “are not
similarly situated in . . . their legal relationship to a child born out
of wedlock.”65 Moreover, the government argued that “[r]equiring
[l]egitimation [s]erved [t]he [i]mportant [g]overnmental [o]bjective
[o]f [r]especting [s]tates’ [a]nd [f]oreign [c]ountries’ [l]aws [r]egarding
[p]aternal [r]ights.”66 The government argued that the distinctions
made between mothers and fathers of “illegitimate” children were
not built upon stereotypes but reasonable legal interpretations.67
Even if the government’s arguments stand, they failed to acknowl-
edge that the State Department issued Tineo a United States pass-
port in 2001.68 By submitting his birth certificate, his father’s birth
certificate, his father’s citizenship certificate, and his mother’s death
certificate, the State found him eligible for a passport.69 Tineo argued
that the issuance of his United States passport established a prima
facie case that he is a citizen.70 The only way to rebut such a presump-
tion is to present evidence that he obtained the passport fraudulently
or illegally.71 However, the government made no showing that the
passport was obtained in a fraudulent way when it was first issued.72
II. “DE-AMERICANIZATION” DURING THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION’S WAR ON IMMIGRATION
The Trump Administration has launched a war on immigration
and has engaged in a tactic of de-Americanizing immigrants.73 As
defined by scholar Bill Hing, the concept of “de-Americanization is
a process that involves racism, but unlike the racism directed at
African Americans, with its foundations in the historically held
beliefs of inferiority, de-Americanizers base their assault on loyalty
and foreignness.”74 It is a process that combines “a mixture of racial
profiling . . . with hate” that results in “othering” people not in the
64. Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 24–26; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a)(3) (West)
(repealed 2000).
65. Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 34.
66. Id. at 38.
67. Id. at 34–35.
68. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 205–06, 208 (3d Cir. 2019).
69. Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 47; see also Tineo, 937 F.3d at 205 (noting that
Tineo’s first removal proceedings were dismissed upon the production of his U.S. passport).
70. See Tineo, 937 F.3d at 208.
71. Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 39.
72. See id. at 39–40.
73. See Saleh, supra note 37; Hing, supra note 1, at 319.
74. Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America,
7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 443–444 (2002).
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majority.75 “When de-Americanization occurs,” people living in the
United States begin to normalize the hate “they see around them.”76
“They begin to believe that those . . . who can hold the title of ‘full-
American’ is [sic] narrow.”77
De-Americanization is more than a xenophobic fear; it is a
“nativism cloaked in a Euro-centric sense of America that combines
hate and racial profiling,” and throughout history, there have been
different periods where the government has engaged in these ef-
forts.78 Despite how Hing limits the definition of de-Americanization
to exclude the experience of African Americans, this Note recognizes
that the process of de-Americanization traces to the first colonial
encounter.79 De-Americanization encompasses the history of indige-
nous genocide and slavery.80
More recently, following the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, de-Americanization has been weaponized to target Muslim
Americans and Arab Americans.81 This violent period of de-Ameri-
canization in the twenty-first century was cloaked by the govern-
ment’s attempt to wage a “war on terrorism.”82 The government
arrested and “voluntarily”83 interviewed men perceived to be of Middle
Eastern descent, including lawful permanent residents and citi-
zens.84 The de-Americanization efforts spread from action taken by
the government to actions taken by private citizens to reinforce the
idea that some people were not part of the United States.85
While the government cannot outright strip naturalized citizens
of their citizenship, if there is a finding that the citizenship was ob-
tained “contrary to [the] law,” it may be revoked through a denaturali-
zation process.86 Denaturalization started in the early twentieth
century following the passage of the Naturalization Act of 1906.87
75. Hing, supra note 1, at 321.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Hing, supra note 74, at 454–55.
79. Cf. id. at 443–44, 452–53. Early in the period of national formation, decisions
were made by Americans through a Euro-centric vision of the United States. See id. at
452–53. This vision did not include the indigenous populations in the United States, the
African slaves kidnapped and taken to the United States, or indentured servants. Cf. id.
As a result, these groups were excluded and deprived of rights afforded to other
“Americans,” starting the process of de-Americanization. See id. at 453 n.68.
80. Cf. id. at 443–44.
81. Hing, supra note 1, at 261–63.
82. See id. at 261–62.
83. Hing, supra note 74, at 442. This was not voluntary by any means. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 444.
86. Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 131 HARV. L. REV. 323, 343 (2017).
87. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 424 (2019).
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The earliest denaturalization efforts focused on gender and race as
a means of narrowing the scope of United States citizens.88 If women
got married or if the immigrants seeking citizenship were of Asian
descent, their status in the United States remained vulnerable.89
Denaturalization became more prominent during the 1940s through
the 1950s.90 It was a tool used during the McCarthy era to combat
fears of the spread of communism in the United States.91
Denaturalization was not revived again as a tool of de-Ameri-
canization until the Obama Administration.92 But, the revival of
denaturalization has been most greatly expanded under the Trump
Administration.93 A larger crackdown on immigration means a larger
budget and more forceful attempts to denaturalize citizens, “taking
denaturalization to [a] new level.”94 The Trump Administration re-
quested $207.6 million to investigate nearly 1,000 United States citi-
zens at risk of denaturalization.95 They plan to review another
700,000 immigration files during 2020.96
The Trump Administration has created a denaturalization task
force and sought civil sanctions, instead of criminal sanctions, in the
process.97 While it is true that U.S. Attorneys have discretion to file
civil or criminal cases, the Trump Administration has encouraged
the pursuit of civil actions, because civil actions have a lower burden
of proof.98 In addition, civil sanctions limit the overall rights of
defendants, like the right to counsel or trial by jury.99 Thus, the
lower burden of proof streamlines the government’s efforts to de-
naturalize citizens.100
The Trump Administration has had success in their efforts.101
In 2017, the government filed an action against Baljinder Singh for
denaturalization, alleging he obtained his naturalization through
88. Id. at 425.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 427–28.
91. See id. at 402, 264.
92. See Maryam Saleh, The Justice Department Singled Out This Man in Expanding
Efforts to Strip Citizenship. A Judge Doesn’t Think the Case Is Open and Shut., THE
INTERCEPT (Feb. 23, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/02/23/denaturaliza
tion-operation-janus-citizenship-trump [https://perma.cc/PBU3-Z2XW] (explaining that
Obama’s Operation Janus put immigrants at risk of denaturalization by identifying those
obtaining citizenship through improper means).
93. Saleh, supra note 37.
94. Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 402, 411.
95. Saleh, supra note 37.
96. Id.
97. Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 402.
98. Id. at 405.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. E.g., id. at 416.
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fraud.102 Singh migrated to the United States as a teen in 1991, and
shortly thereafter, he filed a petition for asylum.103 He married a
United States citizen and then adjusted his status, but under Op-
eration Janus,104 he was found to have entered the United States
under a different name.105 The government alleged that he was
removed under one name, but proceeded with his other name for his
immigration proceedings.106 As a result, the government argued he
obtained his status fraudulently and thus petitioned for his de-
naturalization.107 In 2018, the government won its denaturalization
case against Singh on summary judgement because Singh never
appeared for court and never opposed the motion.108 However, it is
not clear if Singh actually ever received notice of the pending case
because he was not served directly, but instead notice was mailed to
his last known address.109 It is likely that Singh was not even aware
that he had lost his citizenship.110 Singh is just one of many exam-
ples of how the Trump Administration has created a culture where
no one is safe.111
Further proof of this unsafe culture is the Trump Administra-
tion’s threats to take away birthright citizenship.112 The Trump
Administration has demanded that agencies refuse to issue pregnant
women visas, allegedly to prevent “birth tourism.”113 Moreover, the
Trump Administration has used tactics such as arresting spouses
that are presenting for their interviews to obtain a visa.114 The
102. Id.
103. Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 414.
104. Emily C. Callan, A Most Unnatural Body of Law . . . How the Complexities of Opera-
tion Janus and Denaturalization Illustrate the Need for Comprehensive Immigration
Reform, 11 ELON L. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“In 2008, a Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officer identified more than 200 foreign nationals who were subject to deportation orders
entered by immigration judges, but who later used a different biographic identity, such
as an alias name or fabricated date of birth, to attain U.S. citizenship. After further
research into this issue, the U.S. Justice Department launched Operation Janus, the
official initiative to investigate these cases and commence denaturalization proceedings
against the naturalized U.S. citizens, if necessary.”).
105. Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 414–15.
106. Id. at 415.




111. Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 405.
112. See Lyons, supra note 39.
113. See id.; see also Chappell, supra note 39 (denying tourist visas to prevent “birth
tourism”).
114. Tom Jawetz, Bait and Switch: How the Trump Administration Is Trying to Deport
Spouses of U.S. Citizens, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 18, 2020, 9:04 AM), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/02/18/480571/bait-switch-trump
-administration-trying-deport-spouses-u-s-citizens [https://perma.cc/M6KT-8NPW] (ex-
plaining a tactic called a “bait and switch”).
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pervasive efforts being used against immigrants with any sort of crim-
inal record has also been a focus of the Trump Administration.115
Additionally, the Supreme Court has given the government
authorization to deny green cards to people who are “likely” to need
the support of public benefits.116 These benefits include Medicaid,
food stamps, and other methods of public assistance.117 In addition
to being cut off from essential government resources, immigrants
are forced to navigate harsh and confusing immigration laws with-
out legal representation.118 It is a clear demonstration by the Trump
Administration that the immigrants who are favored in the United
States are those who are highly skilled and high income earners.119
However, this is not only a stark demonstration of a favor towards
particular immigrants; by attacking access to public benefits, it is
clear that the Trump Administration is further marginalizing
immigrants with intersectional identities—particularly in the case
of immigrants with disabilities that depend on these services.120
In the efforts to “de-Americanize” immigrants under the Trump
Administration, the government has presented outdated arguments
in the courts as seen in Tineo.121 While Tineo’s case is not one of
denaturalization per se, it is a case of “de-Americanization” where
the government has made a strong effort to prevent him from being
conferred his citizenship, a right that should have been granted to
him when he moved to the United States to live with his father.122
Prior to the Obama and Trump Administrations, the use of
denaturalization as a scare tactic had become rare over the last fifty
years, giving naturalized citizens “a sense of finality and security in
their rights.”123 While this Note focuses on the Trump-era politics,
it is important to emphasize that these problems will not go away
just because the Trump Administration will eventually go away.124
115. Hing, supra note 1, at 271, 273.
116. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump’s Wealth Test for Green Cards, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/us/supreme-court-trump
-green-cards.html [https://perma.cc/TP76-PVD4].
117. Id.
118. Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of
“Courts”, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 317 (2019).
119. Cf. Robert Barnes & Maria Sacchetti, Supreme Court Allows Trump Adminis-





121. See Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2019).
122. See id. at 204; Hing, supra note 1, at 320.
123. Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 402.
124. See Hing, supra note 1, at 318.
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These problems will outlive the Trump Administration because the
executive branch has repeatedly proven to be unwilling to take the
necessary steps to change the law.125 This leaves the courts (and
maybe Congress, however doubtful in the current political climate)
as the appropriate forums for effectuating the changes demanded by
the constitutional mandate of equal protection.126
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S ARCHAIC ARGUMENT IN
TINEO AND THE ISSUE OF REMEDY
Tineo argued that the court has “two remedial alternatives”
when finding a defective statute.127 The “court may either declare it
a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class the
legislation was intended to benefit, or it may extend coverage of the
statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion.”128 Accord-
ingly, the court must inquire what remedy Congress would have
favored.129 Moreover, Tineo argued that the Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated that an “extension is typically appropriate unless Congress
has indicated a preference for nullification, or unless extension would
significantly disrupt the statutory scheme.”130
In response, the government presented an argument archaic on
its face.131 The government asserted that the court cannot grant
Tineo the remedy he seeks in this case because the “power to pro-
vide relief of the sort requested in this [petition]—namely, conferral
of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress.”132
The government contended that courts are to give the legislature
much deference in its use of lawmaking powers in the realm of
immigration, residence, and belonging.133 The government goes on
to say that “the power to make someone a citizen of the United States
has not been conferred upon the federal courts, like mandamus or
injunction, as one of their generally applicable equitable powers.”134
The government argued that the court would “exceed its authority
125. See, e.g., Callan, supra note 104, at 3 (explaining how Operation Janus was
launched during the Obama administration).
126. See id. at 20–21; Tineo, 937 F.3d at 203–04.




131. See id. at 8.
132. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting
Morales-Santana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 216 (quoting INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883–84 (1998)).
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if it created the remedy that Tineo seeks,” which is to extend citizen-
ship by means of deriving it from his father who did not legitimate
him according to law of New York and the Dominican Republic.135
The government relied on an outdated Supreme Court case,
United States v. Ginsberg, to assert this argument.136 In Ginsberg,
the Court asserted that a person born abroad “who seeks political
rights as a member of this nation can rightfully obtain them only
upon terms and conditions specified by Congress.”137 Accordingly,
the Ginsberg Court held that courts cannot exceed the bounds of
Congress in regard to issues of national security that are deemed to
be issues vital to the “public welfare.”138
The government articulated a similar argument in INS v.
Pangilinan.139 In Pangilinan, the respondents contended that they
derived citizenship as Filipino-born World War II veterans because
there existed a congressional statute that provided them with a win-
dow of time during which they could apply to become United States
citizens.140 The government argued that courts did not have the
power to confer citizenship onto Filipino-born World War II veterans
because of the limitations on the congressional statute, stating that
“if Congress refuse[d] to provide relief, . . . that circumstance hardly
provides a court of equity with justification to act for the purported
purpose of carrying out Congress’s intent.”141 The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the lower court did not have the power to confer
citizenship in a way that directly contraposed the limitation im-
posed by Congress in its exercise of its power over naturalization.142
Appellate courts have construed the holding in Pangilinan
narrowly to mean only that the conferral of citizenship cannot be so
that it directly contraposes the limitations provided by Congress,
and they have routinely conferred citizenship onto individuals in
subsequent cases.143 These courts have expressed that granting
citizenship is merely a remedy that extends all the privileges and
135. Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 29, 46.
136. Id. at 46.
137. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474 (1917) (“Courts are without au-
thority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative
will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.”).
138. See id.
139. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883, 885 (1988).
140. Id. at 877–78. The respondents did not file their applications for citizenship
within the window of time provided by statute. Id. at 880.
141. Brief for Petitioner at 50, INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875 (1988) (No. 86-1992).
142. See Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 875–76.
143. See, e.g., Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416, 431–32 (3d Cir. 2000); Tineo v. Att’y
Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2019).
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immunities of citizenship to the individual, as opposed to some use
of an affirmative power by the court.144
Another case involving derivative citizenship through a natural-
ized father was Sessions v. Morales-Santana.145 The respondent in
Morales-Santana, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana, lived in the United
States starting from the age of thirteen.146 His father, José Morales,
moved from his home in Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic days
before his nineteenth birthday.147 As a result, he did not satisfy the
requirements set forth under the immigration statute, which man-
dated a five-year physical presence prior to the child’s birth in order
for the child to derive citizenship.148 Morales-Santana argued that
the one-year requirement for children of unwed mothers violated the
“equal protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment.”149 The
government argued that the child’s first parent is the mother, and the
parental relationship is established later with the child’s father, thus
justifying the physical presence distinction.150 But the court did not
buy that argument, finding little connection between the gender-based
distinction and an important government interest.151
In addition to the argument presented regarding the gender-
based distinction, the government presented an argument in Morales-
Santana which was similar to their argument in Pangilinan, arguing
that the lower court cannot provide a remedy of conferring “citizen-
ship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress.”152 In other
words, the government argued that whatever remedy the court chose
must be tailored to the intent of Congress.153 This is different from
the argument asserted in Tineo, because in Tineo, the government
argued that the court has no power whatsoever to confer citizenship
as a remedy.154 The issue asserted by the government in Tineo
focuses on the plenary power doctrine and whether the court has the
power to confer citizenship in the first place.155
144. See, e.g., Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914, 921–22 (9th Cir.
1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
145. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1686–87.
149. Id. at 1686.
150. Id. at 1695.
151. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1692–93.
152. Brief for Petitioner at 50–51, Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521 (2d Cir.
2015) (No. 15-1191) [hereinafter Lynch’s Brief]; Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520,
537 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. at 420, 453 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)), overruled in part by Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
153. See Lynch’s Brief, supra note 152, at 51.
154. See Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 46.
155. See id.
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It is important to note that this archaic argument asserted by
the government in Tineo falls within a broader political framework,
as is the case with many historical decisions regarding immigration
law in the United States.156 In particular, Tineo falls within a con-
tentious political climate for immigrants exacerbated by the Trump
Administration.157 Under the Trump Administration, it has been
made clear that immigrants are not welcome in the United States,
and even those who have become naturalized citizens are no longer
safe.158 There is an overwhelming effort to denaturalize citizens as
part of this broader overhaul and war on immigration.159
Although the case of Tineo is not considered a “denaturali-
zation” case in the traditional sense, what was done to Tineo can
appropriately be considered an attempt to strip him of his right to
citizenship.160 Although Tineo obtained a United States Passport, a
legal privilege extended to all citizens of the United States, he was
stripped of that document and all the legal rights that should have
been conferred onto him as a child who derived citizenship from his
father.161 The government attempted to find legal arguments to
prevent him from being able to exercise his rights, ultimately set-
tling on the archaic arguments found in Ginsberg and its progeny.162
Tineo appeared pro se during his immigration appeal proceeding
and, had he not made the argument asserting the statute’s gender-
based discrimination, would have lost his right to establish his be-
longing in the United States on appeal.163 What has been made clear
under this contemporary political context is that no one is safe, not
even green card holders within the United States.164 The govern-
ment is willing to use antiquated arguments to fulfill a right-wing,
anti-immigrant agenda if necessary.165
On September 4, 2019, the Third Circuit granted Tineo’s petition,
finding that “precluding a father from ever having his born-out-of-
wedlock child derive citizenship through him” cannot “be squared with
the equal-protection mandate of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
156. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of Immi-
gration Regulation, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 645, 651 (2001).
157. See Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 402.
158. See id.
159. See Saleh, supra note 37.
160. See Tineo’s Brief, supra note 14, at 1.
161. See Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2019).
162. See id. at 208, 215.
163. Id. at 206, 208.
164. See, e.g., Robertson & Manta, supra note 87, at 414–15.
165. See Tineo, 937 F.3d at 215–16 (arguing that complete deference should be given
to Congress in deciding the validity of Tineo’s alleged constitutional violation, an argument
whose validity is clearly contradicted by the Supreme Court’s derivative citizenship
jurisprudence in cases like INS v. Pangilinan).
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Amendment.”166 Applying intermediate scrutiny,167 the court found
that the government did not articulate “how deferring to state
legitimation rules constitutes an important governmental inter-
est.”168 The court added that the distinction between legitimated and
“un-legitimated” children has little importance under state law,
reasoning that the distinction “turns these largely meaningless
vestiges of a bygone era into the defining characteristic for whether
naturalized fathers can ever transmit citizenship to their born-out-
of-wedlock children.”169
The court found that the interplay between the statutes170
“treated women and men differently: a naturalized mother could
transmit her citizenship to her out-of-wedlock child, regardless of
whether the father was alive; whereas a naturalized father in the
same position had the additional requirement of having to legiti-
mate the child in order to transmit his citizenship.”171 Accordingly,
the court held that this distinction violated the “equal-protection
mandate” of the Fifth Amendment.172
While the Court’s holding addressed most of the government’s
arguments, the court seemed to pay nominal attention to the govern-
ment’s assertion that the plenary power doctrine does not permit
the court to grant a remedy in this case of conferring citizenship on
Tineo.173 Instead, the court implied that if Tineo were to prevail in
this case, they would confirm his citizenship rather than grant him
rights that he does not possess.174
IV. PLENARY POWER AND IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Congress and the Executive branch have what is known as “ple-
nary power” over immigration and thus enjoy limited judicial inter-
vention.175 As a result, the judiciary has provided much deference to
166. See id. at 203–04, 217 (“[T]he plenary-power doctrine—while affording Congress
great discretion—‘is subject to important constitutional limitations,’ and ‘it is the prov-
ince of the courts’ to enforce those constraints.’”).
167. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (“Laws granting
or denying benefits ‘on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent,’ . . . post-1970
decisions affirm, differentiate on the basis of gender, and therefore attract heightened
review under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.”).
168. INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 50.
169. Id.; see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(c)(1) (West); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a) (West) (repealed 2000).
170. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(c)(1) (West); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1432(a) (West) (repealed 2000).
171. See Tineo, 937 F.3d at 204.
172. INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 50.
173. See Tineo, 937 F.3d at 216–17.
174. Id. at 215 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 (1998)) (“[A] judgment
in Tineo’s favor ‘would confirm [his] pre-existing citizenship rather than grant [him]
rights that [he] does not now possess.’”).
175. See David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 29, 35, 41–42 (2015).
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the political branches in the realm of immigration.176 However, this
interpretation of the plenary power has changed as the courts have
become more concerned with protecting individual rights and curb-
ing the unfettered discretion of the other branches of government in
the realm of immigration.177
As a result, this puts courts in the position to confer citizen-
ship.178 As some scholars have articulated, the Courts have equity
powers in cases of equal protection in which an equitable remedy is
required.179 Derek Ludwin argues that “[t]he principles of modern
equity, which mandate appropriate remedies in equal protection
cases, provide the Court with the power to confer citizenship.”180 In
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court exercised its
equity powers and conferred the respondent’s citizenship.181 The
respondent was born in the United States to parents who were re-
siding in the country as lawful permanent residents.182 Although the
Fourteenth Amendment granted birthright citizenship to white
people born within the sovereignty of the United States, it did not
include people of color.183 However, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 af-
firmed the rights of non-white people to birthright citizenship.184 As
a result, the Court established the modern conception of birthright
citizenship by conferring the respondent’s status.185 Notwithstand-
ing deferential treatment from the judiciary, Congress does not have
the final word on immigration matters under the plenary power
doctrine, which is when the courts’ equitable power to confer citizen-
ship comes into play.186 Based on this framework, the Court has the
equitable power to confer Tineo’s citizenship.187
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine Then and Now
In the early years of the United States, states governed deci-
sions about immigration and nationality.188 It was not until the late
176. Id. at 29.
177. See Derek Ludwin, Note, Can Courts Confer Citizenship? Plenary Power and
Equal Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376, 1398 (1999).
178. E.g., Tineo, 937 F.3d at 215.
179. Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1379.
180. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
181. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705.
182. Id. at 652.
183. Id. at 674–75.
184. Id. at 675, 703.
185. Id. at 649.
186. See id. at 700.
187. See Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1397–98.
188. See, e.g., Steinfeld, supra note 156, at 651.
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nineteenth century that the first federal immigration law was passed,
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.189 It marked one of the many
periods in United States history when the Court legitimized the
government’s xenophobic gatekeeping on the basis of race, ethnicity,
and what would later include gender, ability, and so on.190
The plenary power doctrine can be traced to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chae Chan Ping, and more generally to the period of
Chinese exclusion.191 In Chae Chan Ping, the petitioner appealed an
order that refused his release from detention in San Francisco,
California.192 The petitioner, a native of China, was residing in the
United States where he worked as a laborer.193 The petitioner had
a certificate granting him permission to take a trip to China to visit
his family, but upon his return to the United States, customs offi-
cers detained him on the ground that there was a new law passed
by Congress excluding Chinese nationals from entering into the
United States.194 The petitioner argued that prohibiting his re-entry
into the United States violated a treaty that existed between China
and the United States.195
Although it was true that the law violated the treaty between
the countries, the Court still held that “the last expression of the
sovereign will must control.”196 The Court asserted that “[t]he power
of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever,
in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has
been asserted in repeated instances, and never denied by the execu-
tive or legislative departments.”197 The threat of subjecting mea-
sures during “times of crisis” to “detailed litigation would interfere
with the flexibility often necessary to act beyond [the country’s]
border[s].”198 This power of the federal government was not a power
found in the Constitution, but rather asserted by the Court.199
Scholars have critiqued this expansion of federal power not
found in the Constitution because prior to Chae Chan Ping, deci-
sions regarding migration and belonging were upheld under the
189. See id. at 647.
190. See Erika Lee, The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and Ameri-
can Gatekeeping, 1882–1924, J. AM. ETHNIC HIST., Spring 2002, at 38.
191. Martin, supra note 175, at 30.
192. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 581–82 (1889).
193. Id. at 582.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 589.
196. Martin, supra note 175, at 33.
197. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606–07.
198. Martin, supra note 175, at 42.
199. Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 23 (2015).
226 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:207
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.200 In Chae Chan Ping, the
Court introduced a “novel theory of power devolved from sovereignty”
that seemed to confer upon the legislative and executive branches
extreme deference in the realm of immigration.201 It is on this con-
ception of the plenary powers that the government ultimately rests
its argument in Tineo.202
Although the plenary power doctrine is “premised explicitly on
the notion that the political branches of the federal government are
responsible for the nation’s security and for its relations with other
sovereigns[,]”203 the Court shifted that framework, particularly in
cases dealing directly with individual rights.204 The plenary power
doctrine went from meaning “absolute federal power over borders”
and “non-justiciability of challenges to immigration law” to applying
judicial scrutiny in determining whether to uphold an immigration
statute.205 The new approach provided less deference to legislative
and executive decisions regarding immigration.206 Lower courts have
decided cases by using traditional tools of statutory interpretation
and have rejected the idea that the political branches have unre-
strained power over immigration.207
One example of when the Court has been critical of the political
branches’ power over immigration is in Zadvydas v. Davis.208 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the government did not have the
power to detain an immigrant admitted into the United States for
an indefinite period of time.209 Whereas the government in Tineo
argued that the Court must provide extreme deference to the politi-
cal branches, Zadvydas is an example of the Court’s check on those
powers.210 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, stated that Congress “is subject to important constitutional
200. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There
a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307, 308–09 (2000).
201. Id. at 309.
202. See Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 213, 215 (3d Cir. 2019).
203. Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other”: Indians, Immi-
grants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International
Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 436 (2002).
204. See id. at 437; Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1379; Carrie Rosenbaum, Immigration
Law’s Due Process Deficit and the Persistence of Plenary Power, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
118, 120 (2018); Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and
the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2010).
205. Shalini Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law, 80 OHIO
STATE L.J. 13, 30–31 (2019).
206. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era
of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 65 (2015).
207. See id.
208. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 680 (2001).
209. Id.
210. See Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 15–16; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
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limitations,” demonstrating another chip away at the strength of the
plenary power doctrine.211
Even though the Court has been unpredictable in its outcomes,
it is nevertheless willing to push back on the political branches.212
Nguyen v. INS pointed to a clear departure from the plenary power
doctrine by expanding constitutionally mandated rights to non-
citizens.213 Although the Supreme Court upheld the gender-based
distinction for derivative citizenship for unwed mothers and fathers,
the most important takeaway from Nguyen is that the Court used
an equal protection analysis to resolve the issue.214 The analysis was
not one of plenary power and deference to Congress, but instead
subjecting the statute to the scrutiny applied for other constitu-
tional violations.215
In Tineo, the government argued that “[t]he issue of derivative
citizenship is a purely legal issue of statutory interpretation . . . over
which the Court exercises plenary review . . . [i]f Congress has so
spoken, the inquiry is at an end, for courts.”216 However, it is clear
under Nguyen that the government’s argument holds no merit, as
evinced by the fact that the Court has applied heightened scrutiny
to equal protection violations in other cases.217 In Miller v. Albright,
for example, the petitioner was born in the Philippines to a United
States citizen father and non-U.S. citizen mother, but the Court de-
nied the petitioner United States citizenship on the grounds that the
court order of paternity was not enough evidence to assert that she
had a “bona fide parental relationship” with her father.218 The peti-
tioner challenged the constitutionality of the gender-based distinc-
tion under the immigration statute for children born out of wedlock,
which required that a child be legitimated by their father to derive
citizenship.219 Although the Court found that the statute was neces-
sary to advance the government’s interest in “protecting” legitima-
tion laws, it nonetheless applied a heightened standard of review,220
211. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The
Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002).
212. E.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
213. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53–55; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002).
214. Spiro, supra note 213, at 339.
215. See id.
216. Government’s Brief, supra note 34, at 15, 17 (emphasis added).
217. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61.
218. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1998); Aubry Holland, Comment, The
Modern Family Unit: Toward A More Inclusive Vision of the Family in Immigration Law,
96 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1063 (2008); see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(4) (West).
219. Miller, 523 U.S. at 426; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1409(a)(4) (West).
220. See Holland, supra note 218, at 1063.
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marking an important shift from unfettered government power over
immigration toward individual liberties and rights.221
B. The Equitable Remedy to Confer Citizenship
Scholars have articulated that courts have equity powers that
can outweigh those of the plenary powers, particularly in cases of
equal protection in which an equitable remedy is required.222 Accord-
ing to Derek Ludwin, “equity has been ‘stretched’ to offer relief to
whole social classes, and the Supreme Court has ‘fused’ the idea of
equity with the right to equal protection under the law,” as seen by
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the Civil Rights Era.223
The Court most prominently exercised their equity powers in
remedying Constitutional violations in the desegregation cases.224
Brown v. Board of Education is the “most prominent example” of
federal court expression of modern equitable remedy actions.225 Courts
interpreted the decisions in desegregation cases, like Brown, to in-
clude the scope by which courts can remedy an equal protection vio-
lation.226 In other words, courts have broad and flexible powers to
remedy a violation when it has been established that there has been
an equal protection violation.227 The implication of Brown exceeds that
of desegregation and extends to other constitutional rights, as “the
nature of the [constitutional] violation d[ictates] . . . the remedy.”228
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court required Kansas City to use
tax dollars to fund a school desegregation plan.229 The Supreme
Court rejected the state’s argument that “the federal judicial power
can go no further than to require local governments to levy taxes as
authorized under state law.”230 Moreover, the Court held that “a
local government with taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes
in excess of the limit set by state statute where there is reason
based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limita-
tion.”231 The Court ordered Kansas City to impose greater property
221. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 440–41.
222. Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1404–05.
223. Id. at 1397–98.
224. Id. at 1398.
225. See id.
226. Id. (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies.”).
227. See id.
228. Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1398.
229. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990).
230. Id. at 56.
231. Id. at 57.
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taxes on its residents to find the capital required to be able to pay
the debt to desegregate the school districts.232
In Cody v. Caterisano, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged this
departure from the concept that the legislative and executive branches
have almost complete deference in the realm of immigration.233 The
Fourth Circuit held that “[c]ourts have the power to confer citizenship
only ‘in strict compliance with the terms of an authorizing statute.’”234
Moreover, “though the plenary power doctrine forecloses most direct
constitutional challenges against congressional immigration stat-
utes, it is hardly the blank check for the executive that is sometimes
suggested. Significant statute-based challenges to executive action
remain available, as do procedural due process challenges. . . .”235
And in Breyer v. Meissner, the Third Circuit conferred citizen-
ship upon the petitioner who had been ordered to denaturalize.236 In
that case, the petitioner challenged his denaturalization, which was
based upon his service as a Nazi guard in World War II.237 The pe-
titioner was born abroad to a United States citizen mother in 1925.238
At the time, the law granted citizenship to children born abroad to
United States citizen fathers and not mothers.239 A subsequent
immigration statute retroactively granted citizenship to children of
United States citizen mothers so long as the child had not intention-
ally engaged in Nazi activities.240 Applying intermediate scrutiny,
the court found that the government did not provide an important
interest to justify the gender-based distinction.241 The court con-
cluded that he was improperly denied citizenship at birth and thus
conferred his right to citizenship.242
In Tineo, the Third Circuit stated that in situations when a
statute, in violation of equal protection principles, benefits one class
and excludes another from the benefit, the right invoked is that of
equal treatment to the unbenefited class.243 “[T]he appropriate rem-
edy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accom-
plished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as
by extension of benefits to the excluded class.”244
232. Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1399; see Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 36.
233. See Cody v. Caterisano, 631 F.3d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 2011).
234. Id. (quoting INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 884 (1988)).
235. Martin, supra note 175, at 31.
236. Breyer v. Meissner, 214 F.3d 416, 432 (3d Cir. 2000).
237. Id. at 419–20.
238. Id. at 419.
239. Id. at 420.
240. See id. at 422, 428.
241. Id. at 428.
242. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 432.
243. See Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2019).
244. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017).
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In Tineo, the court turned to the issue of remedy and extended
the right that confers on unwed mothers the benefit of passing their
citizenship status to their child to fathers.245 Distinguishing Tineo
from Morales-Santana, the court held that extending Tineo’s father
the same treatment asserted by the statute did not “disrupt the
statutory scheme in any significant way.”246 In Morales-Santana, the
Court dismissed the government’s plenary power argument.247 There
the government argued that extreme deference should be given to
Congress and the executive.248 Instead, the Court focused on the
gender-based discrimination issue to determine what remedy was
suitable to resolve the case.249 Moreover, “[t]he Court in Morales-
Santana—and in Nguyen—declined to adopt the nonremediability
theory, . . . because it is premised on a constitutional conception of
the federal courts’ powerlessness in citizenship cases that a majority
of the Justices have not embraced.”250 It is not the holding of the
Supreme Court that the plenary power prohibits the courts to
remedy an equal protection violation.251 The Supreme Court contin-
ues to check the power of the executive and legislative branches in
the realm of immigration.252
Although Tineo’s past criminal convictions do not garner much
sympathy, the court held that the consequences of Tineo’s actions
were “what the law provides is permissible for any other citizen who
is convicted of the same offenses.”253 These are clear examples of
when the Court has conferred citizenship as a means to remedy a
constitutional violation because the Court has the power to confer
citizenship under its equity powers.254
Issues of naturalization and taxation provide the federal govern-
ment with much deference, but the Court was still willing to exer-
cise its equity power to override that deference.255 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Pangilinan presents the strongest opposition to the
Court’s power to confer citizenship as a remedy to a constitutional
245. See Tineo, 937 F.3d at 217–18.
246. INTERPRETER RELEASES, supra note 50.
247. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1698. Contra Lynch’s Brief, supra note 152,
at 13–14.
248. Lynch’s Brief, supra note 152, at 13–14.
249. Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131
HARV. L. REV. 170, 171 (2017).
250. Id. at 215.
251. See id. at 221.
252. See, e.g., Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700–01.
253. Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2019).
254. See Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1397, 1405–06 (“The Supreme Court was given
authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to promulgate rules of equity, which it did in
accordance with the British model.”).
255. Id. at 1404–05.
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violation.256 Still, the Court decided Morales-Santana years later,
which on its face appears to directly contradict the opinion in Pangili-
nan.257 The Court had a greater concern to remedy the equal protec-
tion violation than to reconcile the tension between the two cases.258
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan stressed in their juris-
prudence that “for every constitutional violation there is a remedy.”259
Citizens have the power to vote out representatives when faced with
taxation issues; the same cannot be said for noncitizens who lack
that power.260 This perhaps is the foundation under which justifies
the Court’s rejection of the government’s argument in the context
when an equal protection violation is encountered in the naturaliza-
tion process.261 When Congress is unwilling to remedy the inconsis-
tencies in immigration laws and the President chooses to wage a
war against some of the most vulnerable people, the judiciary has
no choice but to intervene.262 This case is reflective of that tension
and is reflective of the powerful role the courts play.263
CONCLUSION
On October 2, 2015, before the Board of Immigration Appeals,
Tineo argued that as a child, he derived citizenship from his father
(who passed away in 2006) and thus should have been deemed a
United States citizen.264 The burden imposed on Tineo, appearing
pro se before an immigration judge to ensure that he was properly
conferred citizenship, was insurmountable.265 Tineo knew that he
256. See INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988).
257. Compare Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 883, with Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700–01.
258. See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700–01.
259. Collin O’Connor Udell, Miller v. Albright: Plenary Power, Equal Protection, and
the Rights of an Alien Love Child, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 621, 654 (1998).
260. Ludwin, supra note 177, at 1404–05.
261. Id. at 1404–05; see Collins, supra note 249, at 221 (“[Morales-Santana] explicitly
rejects the proposition that the plenary power doctrine is applicable in constitutional
challenges to the derivative citizenship statute, refuses to credit the government’s jus-
tifications for the gender lines drawn in that statute, and holds that, going forward,
statutory citizenship must be administered in conformity with modern constitutional
equality principles.”).
262. See Tineo v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 200, 212–13, 215; Lyons, supra note 39; Paul
Kane, ‘Get So Close—and Nothing Happens’: Congress’s Record on Immigration Is Re-
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should have derived citizenship; he was unable to convince officials
of such.266
This case falls within the heart of the Trump Administration’s
war on immigrants.267 However, the term “immigrants” is too broad
to define the group of people on which this war is being waged. The
war is against the poor, uneducated, and most vulnerable immi-
grants.268 With greater intersections of identities like that of Tineo,
who is an Afro-Latinx immigrant, of a lower income bracket, with-
out a higher education, and a criminal record, his chances in this
fight were meant to be slim.269
The Third Circuit already conferred citizenship as a remedy in
other cases, and it was well within their power to do so.270 It is clear
that the Court was well within its power to provide Tineo with a
proper remedy and that remedy was to confer his status as a citizen.271
The courts have a role in this war, and it is well within their power
to prevent these de-Americanization efforts.
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